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LAW VS. SCIENCE: LEGAL CONTROL OF GENETIC
RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
A recent cartoon appearing in Time magazine' shows a
delighted MIT scientist dancing into his laboratory which con-
taines an assortment of genetic monsters. The scientist had
just received news that the City Council of Cambridge had
voted to permit recombinant DNA research at MIT. The same
page in Time shows a photograph of an atomic bomb explosion.
The message is obvious: permitting scientists to pursue such
genetic research could create new forms of life which could
ultimately lead to massive destruction of life on earth, and the
need for legal control of such research is therefore imperative.
The new recombinant DNA techniques, which give scien-
tists ability to alter the genetic structure of an organism, have
elicited unparalleled response within the scientific com-
munity,2 and the prospect of unprecedented legal control of
such research has stirred an even greater response. Since the
time of Galileo, scientists have struggled to achieve their treas-
ured freedom of inquiry.3 The real issue, then, is whether the
legal system should impose controls on the traditionally un-
hampered pursuit of the truth. The question can only be re-
solved through an analysis of the rights and interests of the
scientific community balanced against the rights and interests
of society.
I. THE NATURE OF RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH
A. The New Technique
The controversial "gene splicing" technique involved in
Trippett, Science: No Longer a Sacred Cow, TIME, March 7, 1977, at 72.
2 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATroRNEY GENERAL ON
RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH (February 8, 1977), at i [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF
THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL].
3 Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notes from the Ivory
Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 596, 597 (1972).
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recombinant DNA research was developed in 1972 and for the
first time permitted researchers to manipulate genetic mate-
rial, known as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), within the cells of
certain lower organisms.' The technique involves utilizing a
certain enzyme,5 known as restriction endonuclease,l to cut the
DNA isolated from another organism. By this method, a DNA
molecule containing portions of DNA from two different types
of organisms can be constructed.7 The new molecule is then
inserted inside a "host" cell, which multiplies into a "clone
' 8
of cells, each containing identical sets of newly-constructed
DNA.
DNA is the cellular substance that controls the biological
make-up of all organisms. The difference among species, and
even among members of the same species, is in large part due
to differences in DNA. Thus, placing DNA segments from one
organism into the DNA of another has the potential of permit-
ting the "host" organism to produce some characteristics of the
organism from which the foreign DNA was extracted. It is pos-
sible, then, that DNA from one species could be spliced into
bacterial DNA, resulting in the creation of bacteria that could
produce some characteristics of the other species.'
B. Possible Benefits and Possible Dangers of Recombinant
DNA Research
Though such research is considered "pure science," that
is, research performed in the quest for knowledge rather than
for immediate practical application, certain benefits may be
obtained from recombinant DNA research. The most immedi-
ate benefit is the advancement of scientific knowledge." Bene-
Recombinant DNA: Impacts and Advances, 109 SCIENCE NEWS 389 (1976).
An enzyme is a type of protein that promotes the chemical processes of life
without itself being altered or destroyed. McGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF THE LIFE
ScIENcEs 234 (D. Lapedes ed. 1976).
4 See Recombinant DNA: Impacts and Advances, supra note 4, for a discussion
of restriction endonuclease.
41 Fed. Reg. 38,428 (1976).
A clone is a population of cells or organisms derived from a single cell or organ-
ism without sexual reproduction. R. 1IEGER, A. MICHAEus, & M. GREEN, GLOSSARY OF
GENETICS AND CYTOGENETICS 109 (4th ed. 1976).
' 41 Fed. Reg. 38,426 (1976).
' Cohen, Recombinant DNA: Fact and Fiction, 195 SCIENCE 654, 655 (1977).
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fits to society include the use of organisms containing recombi-
nant DNA to produce substances of medical importance. For
instance, human DNA segments which direct, or "code," the
production of insulin could be spliced into bacterial DNA, and
the bacterial hosts could be used to produce human insulin
cheaply and efficiently, which would be a benefit to diabetics."
Other possible applications have been suggested, such as the
use of recombinant organisms in the production of vitamins,
antibiotics, and vaccines.'2 Pharmaceutical and chemical in-
dustries have already become aware of the potential benefits of
such research, and these industries have considered initiating
their own recombinant DNA research.'
3
Unfortunately, the very characteristics which give such
research potential for beneficial application also confer poten-
tial for substantial risk. Organisms with the ability to produce
some unnatural or unpredicted substance might escape from
the laboratory and become serious pests.'4 Some critics have
pointed out that the technique essentially creates new types of
organisms, and therefore the natural barriers between organ-
isms that have evolved to maintain the "balance of nature"
could be broken. The result may potentially be "biological and
social chaos."' 5
The potential for danger is enhanced by the fact that the
organism best understood and most commonly used as a host
in recombinant DNA research is Escherichia coli (E. coli), a
type of bacterium that inhabits the human gut.'6 E. coli in its
" Bennett & Gurin, Science that Frightens Scientists, 239 THE ATL rIC, Febru-
ary 1977, at 44.
12 Cohen, supra note 10, at 655-56. Researchers have successfully transferred genes
which provide nitrogen-fixing ability in a certain bacterium into E. coli, which does
not otherwise have the ability to fix nitrogen. This technique could lead to alternatives
to chemical fertilizers. Brill, Biological Nitrogen Fixation, 236 ScmIrIFIC ANIERncAN,
March 1977, at 68.
12 See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 2, at 7, for
a discussion of potential pharmaceutical uses.
'1 See Bennett & Gurin, supra note 11, at 44, for a discussion of these dangers; 41
Fed. Reg. 38,430 (1976).
11 Sinsheimer, An Evolutionary Perspective for Genetic Engineering, 73 NEW
SCIENTIST 150, 150 (1977).
16 The particular strain of E. coli generally used is known as K-12, which is a
laboratory-developed strain that is a very poor colonizer of the human system. REPORT
OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 2, at 22.
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natural state is relatively harmless. There is fear, though, that
an escaped experimental E. coli strain containing recombinant
DNA may colonize in the bowels of the human population and
produce some undesired substance or become pathogenic.
17
Though critics of recombinant DNA research have stated
that the risks involved could lead to disaster, 8 the risks are
merely potential and speculative, as they have never been dem-
onstrated. 9 Other scientists have pointed out the overwhelm-
ing unlikelihood that such risks will be manifested and there-
fore have de-emphasized the dangers of recombinant DNA re-
search. 2 The conclusion is inescapable, however, that the like-
lihood of danger resulting from recombinant DNA research is
simply not known.
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONTROL OF RECOMBINANT
DNA RESEARCH
A. The First Concerns of Scientists
Shortly after the recombinant DNA technique was discov-
ered, scientists involved with the technique became concerned
with the potential for danger. At the Gordon Research Confer-
ence on Nucleic Acids in 1973, researchers in attendance con-
firmed their concern over the research, and recommended fur-
ther study by the National Academy of Sciences and the con-
sideration of establishing guidelines. 21 Scientists led by Paul
Berg, who chaired the Committee on Recombinant DNA of the
1" 41 Fed. Reg. 38,430 (1976). Pathogenic organisms are those that are capable of
producing disease. McGRAw-HILL Dic-roNARY OF THE LIFE SCIENCES 636 (D. Lapedes ed.
1976).
IR See Sinsheimer, supra note 15.
' Berg, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 SCIENCE 303
(1974); Cohen, supra note 10, at 654-55. SCIENCE reported three incidents that were
labeled "narrow escapes" which illustrate the possibility of potentially dangerous re-
combinant organisms being released into the environment and becoming nuisances.
For example, at Stanford University an experiment was contemplated where a gene
from the dangerous SV40 virus was to be inserted into E. coli. Wade, Dicing with
Nature: Three Narrow Escapes, 195 SCIENCE 378 (1977).
2* See Cohen, supra note 10, at 654-55. A British scientist used mathematical
probabilities to illustrate the extreme unlikelihood of danger resulting from such re-
search. Holliday, Should Genetic Engineers Be Contained?, 73 NEW SCIENTIsT 399
(1977).
21 Singer & Soll, Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules, 181 SCIENCE 1114 (1973);
see Bennett & Gurin, supra note 11, at 48.
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National Academy of Sciences, called for an unprecedented
moratorium on recombinant DNA research until more specific
guidelines could be established.
2
Prior to this action, the problems with recombinant DNA
research were considered scientific problems to be worked out
by scientists. The self-imposed "moratorium," however, was
the event that precipitated public concern over the research.2
Though the nature of the research and the risks involved
tended to be misinterpreted by the public, 4 it was this initial
concern which eventually led to public involvement and the
development of governmental regulations.
B. Asilomar Conference-Scientists Attempt Self-Regulation
The first attempt at regulating recombinant DNA research
came from the scientists themselves at an international confer-
ence which convened in February 1975 at Pacific Grove, Cali-
fornia. The participants at the Asilomar Conference, as it is
known, agreed that the research should proceed under a set of
guidelines adopted by the Conference .2 The guidelines banned
certain experiments deemed potentially very dangerous, but
allowed other experiments to proceed, provided that the exper-
imental organisms were adequately "contained" in accordance
with the potential risk of specific experiments. That is, the
greater the risk involved, the more stringent the "contain-
ment" requirement.2 6
C. The NIH Guidelines
Although researchers in general conformed to the Asilomar
regulations,27 the regulations were internal only and not legally
enforceable.28 The Asilomar guidelines, however, served as the
basis for the first controls imposed by the federal government
2 See Berg, supra note 19.
21 See Bennett & Gurin, supra note 11, at 49.
24 Id.
21 SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE AsmLOMAR CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA
MOLECULES (May 20, 1975), reprinted in 188 SCIENCE 991 (1975).
26 Id.
21 Comment, The Potential for Genetic Engineering: A Proposal for International




in the form of the Guidelines drafted by the National Institutes
of Health.29 The NIH Guidelines are more stringent and de-
tailed than those adopted by the Asilomar Conference; 3 more-
over, they ban certain extremely dangerous experiments31 and
require specific containment standards for permitted experi-
ments, which are graded according to the risk involved.
Containment is provided by two methods: biological and
physical. The minimal physical containment required is the
"PI" level for experiments involving little or no risk.32 Experi-
ments involving low or moderate risks require "P2" or "P3"
levels of containment. High risk experiments may be con-
ducted only in "P4" containment facilities, which require com-
plete isolation from the experimental area, shower rooms
through which the experimenters must enter and leave, and
other engineering features designed to prevent micro-
organisms from escaping into the environment.
3
A graded series of "biological containment" requirements
is also imposed on recombinant DNA research. The E. coli host
strain used experimentally is much less likely to survive in the
human system than the native E. coli strain. Therefore, some
inherent biological containment is provided by the low likeli-
hood of the experimental organisms' surviving outside the labo-
ratory. Additional biological containment is required by the
Guidelines; the minimal standard of containment required is
titled "EK1. ' '34 Biological containment requiring the use of E.
coli strains with even less likelihood of surviving outside the
experimental area is tagged "EK2. ' 35 The highest level of bio-
logical containment requirements, "EK3, ' ' 31 is imposed on cer-
tain high risk experiments.3 7
41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976).
' 41 Fed. Reg. 38,434 (1976).
One example of a banned experiment is transferring drug-resistant traits into
microorganisms which are not naturally drug-resistant. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,914-15 (1976).
31 Most laboratories used for microbial experiments satisfy this level of contain-
ment. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,912 (1976).
1 41 Fed. Reg. 27,913-14 (1976). The National Cancer Institute facilities at Fort
Detrick, Maryland, are among the few laboratories presently satisfying P4 contain-
ment requirements. Culliton, Recombinant DNA: Cambridge City Council Votes
Moratorium, 193 SCIENCE 300, 300 (1976).
3 41 Fed. Reg. 27,915-16 (1976).
35 41 Fed. Reg. 27,916-17 (1976).
41 Fed. Reg. 27,917 (1976).
One example is an experiment involving the insertion of primate DNA into the
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Compliance with the NIH Guidelines, though originally
voluntary,' s is now mandatory for all NIH-funded research.39
However, compliance with the NIH Guidelines is still volun-
tary for non-federally-funded research, such as that conducted
by pharmaceutical companies. 0 This shortcoming" and the
belief by some critics that the Guidelines may be inadequate
4 2
have spawned additional concern at the local and federal lev-
els.43
D. Regulation at the Local Level
Public interest evoked by recombinant DNA research has
been unprecedented, as evidenced by the concern for regulating
such research at the local level.44 At the university level, regula-
tion of the research was debated at the University of Michigan,
the outcome being in favor of permitting the research.45 Cities
with major universities likely to conduct such research have
considered establishing regulations. Ann Arbor, Michigan, and
Bloomington, Indiana, have at least tentatively decided
against restricting the research. Madison, Wisconsin, is pres-
ently considering holding a public debate on the topic, 4 and a
San Diego, California, study committee established by the
Mayor has already heard debate and endorsed the NIH Guide-
lines, with minor qualifications, and has required the Univer-
sity of California at San Diego to refrain from conducting expe-
host DNA, when the laboratory satisfies P3 but not P4 physical containment require-
ments. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,917 (1976). An EK3 host organism has yet to be developed.
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 2, at 13.
38 Wade, NIH Seeks Law on Gene-Splice Research, 195 SCIENCE 859 (1977).
31 41 Fed. Reg. 38,427 (1976). The NIH Guidelines, even where compliance is
required, have been criticized for lacking an effective enforcement scheme. Wade,
Recombinant DNA: New York Ponders Action to Control Research, 194 SCIENCE 705
(1976).
' See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 2, at 11.
4, 41 Fed. Reg. 38,427 (1976). However, the mere establishment of the NIH Guide-
lines may influence compliance with the standards by all recombinant DNA research-
ers.
42 Wade, Gene-Splicing: At Grass-Roots Level a Hundred Flowers Bloom, 195
SCIENCE 558 (1977).
13 See Wade, supra note 38.
1' See Wade, supra note 42.
11 Id. at 559; Bennett & Gurin, supra note 11, at 59.




riments requiring P4 facilities. 8
Mayor Vellucci's attempt to ban much of the research in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, has drawn the most attention. The
Mayor was successful in persuading the City Council to impose
a temporary moratorium on the research at Harvard and MIT
until a review board of scientists and citizens investigated the
research more thoroughly. 9 In spite of Mayor Vellucci's insist-
ence that a ban on P3 and P4 experiments be imposed, the
review board unanimously decided to recommend permitting
the research to proceed." In February 1977 the City Council
rejected Mayor Vellucci's proposal and adopted the recommen-
dations of the review board, permitting the research to proceed
under the NIH Guidelines, with some minor additional restric-
tions.51
At the state level, New York, New Jersey, and California
have considered regulation of the research. New Jersey Attor-
ney General William Hyland is considering drafting regula-
tions, but realizes that excessive regulation would only result
in driving the research underground. 52 In California, two legis-
lative committees are holding hearings concerning legislative
regulation of the research, which may result in the adoption of
the NIH Guidelines for all recombinant DNA research per-
formed in the state. 3
In New York, State Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz has
held public hearings on the question of regulation.54 In Febru-
ary of 1977, the Attorney General released his findings and
recommendations5 and submitted a bill56 to the state legisla-
11 Id. Recombinant DNA research is being conducted at the University of Ken-
tucky Medical Center by Dr. Robert Dickson. The research involves splicing a yeast
gene which codes for beta-galactosidase, an enzyme involved in the digestion of milk
sugar, into an E. coli host. The research is NIH-funded and requires P2 physical
containment and EK1 biological containment. Compliance with the Guidelines will be
assured by the Biohazards Committee established at the University. Though the re-
search at the University of Kentucky may be expanded in the future, no other institu-
tion in Kentucky has current plans to conduct such research.
4' See Culliton, supra note 33, at 300.
Wade, Gene-Splicing: Cambridge Citizens OK Research but Want More Safety,
195 SCIENCE 268 (1977).
11 Wade, DNA: Laws, Patents, and a Proselyte, 195 ScIENcE 762 (1977).
52 See Wade, supra note 42.
,3 Id.
Wade, supra note 39.
See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 2.
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ture requiring all recombinant DNA experimenters to be certi-
fied by the Commissioner of Public Health and allowing the
Commissioner considerable discretion in permitting or prohib-
iting recombinant DNA experiments.57 The New York bill dif-
fers from the NIH regulations in that it provides a means of
enforcement of the regulations through suspension of certifica-
tion,58 while the NIH Guidelines have no enforcement scheme.
E. Additional Regulation at the Federal Level
Because the NIH Guidelines are imposed only on NIH-
funded research and are difficult to enforce even at that level,
NIH has sponsored legislation that would considerably broaden
the application of the Guidelines. 9 On February 4, 1977, Sena-
tor Dale Bumpers introduced into the United States Senate the
DNA Research Act of 1977,60 which would make the NIH
Guidelines apply to all research involving recombinant DNA.'
In addition, the Bill provides means for enforcing the regula-
tions. The Bill is now being considered by the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Health and Scientific Research, and additional hear-
ings will be held.
2
Whether the DNA Research Act of 1977 is enacted or not,
it is inevitable that federal regulations will be extended 3 In
"' An Act to Amend the Public Health Law, in Relation to the Certification of
Recombinant DNA Experiments, art. 32-A, §§ 3220-3223 (1977).
57 Id. § 3222.
Id. § 3223.
51 See Wade, supra note 38. Guidelines Director Donald Fredrickson has voiced
approval of the federal legislation. Louisville Courier-Journal, February 21, 1977, § A,
at 1, col. 1.
60 S. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REc. 2274 (1977). Senator Bumpers was
concerned specifically with pharmaceutical companies, who are not required to comply
with the NIH Guidelines at present. 95 CONG. REc. 2274. A similar bill has been
introduced into the House of Representatives by Rep. Richard Ottinger. H.R. 3591-
92, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REC. 1117 (1977).
11 S. 621 purports to derive its power to institute such regulation from the com-
merce power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; S.621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 95 CONG.
REC. 2274 (1977).
'" See Wade, supra note 38. A revised version of the Bill was introduced by Senator
Kennedy in April, 1977. S.1217, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REc. 5335 (1977).
63 See Wade, supra note 38. The Commerce Department is also involved in the
recombinant DNA research issue because of the possibility that industry will patent
certain recombinant DNA techniques that result in the manufacture of beneficial
materials. See 42 Fed. Reg. 2712 (1977).
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fact, federal regulations may be supported by scientists, in the
hope that federal regulation may avoid the enactment of possi-
bly overly-restrictive local regulations. 4
F. The Uniqueness of Recombinant DNA Research
Regulations
The regulation of recombinant DNA research is unprece-
dented in two aspects. First, science, not technology, is the
subject of regulation. Technology involves the application of
knowledge to a practical use. The regulation of nuclear energy
constitues an example of extensive regulation of the technologi-
cal application of atomic physics. 5 The regulation of recombi-
nant DNA research is not such a technological regulation, as
it is not the use of the research which is the immediate concern
of the regulators, but the possible undesirable consequences of
the research itself.
Second, though regulation of scientific research itself does
exist, recombinant DNA research regulation differs with re-
spect to the dangers sought to be prevented. Regulations de-
signed to protect animals66 or human subjects 7 used in research
are examples of regulation of scientific research, but the dan-
gers to be avoided are known and demonstrable. The dangers
involved in recombitant DNA research are not yet known-
they are still speculative. 8 Therefore, the recombinant DNA
regulations differ from other scientific regulations in that the
dangers involved with the research are unknown potential
dangers rather than known and demonstrable dangers.
III. LIMITED RIGHT TO FREE INQUIRY
It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss whether
the present or proposed regulations will be effective in prevent-
ing disaster which may result from recombinant DNA research.
The question here is whether the public, hence the government,
should be involved in the control of pure scientific research at
" See Wade, supra note 38.
See 10 C.F.R. §§ 0-170 (1976).
3A C.J.S. Animals § 102 (1973).
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1976).
"Berg, supra note 19.
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all. The answer lies in a resolution of the conflict between the
right of free scientific inquiry and the right of the public to be
safe and secure.
A. The Right to Free Inquiry
Supporters of free scientific inquiry warn of the "dangers
facing modern society if it chooses to foreclose avenues of
knowledge and discovery which might lead to the emancipation
of mankind from the chains of ignorance and disease."69 Be-
cause pure research has traditionally been unregulated, 70 scien-
tists are often fearful of any legal control.7' Any threat of con-
trol of science is often equated with the Vatican's inquisition
of Galileo. 72 According to this view, then, science should be left
exclusively to the scientists.
Total scientific autonomy in the area of recombinant DNA
research would imply that all restrictions on the research must
be imposed only by the scientists involved.7 3 Proponents of this
view fear that once the public initiates monitoring and regulat-
ing of DNA experiments, the public will increase its demands
that all scientific research meet its requirements for social de-
sirability.74 The result in the long run would be detrimental to
both science and society.75
B. The Public Interest
On the other side of the conflict is the danger that recom-
binant DNA research may be harmful to the public, even
though the precise risks have not yet been ascertained. 7 So-
11 Comment, supra note 27, at 416.
7' Id. at 417.
7, See Lederberg, supra note 3, at 596.
72 Id. Such fears may also explain the attitude of the scientific community towards
lawyers. See Curlin, Mutatis Mutandis: Congress, Science, and Law, 190 SCIENCE 839
(1975).
73 See Wade, supra note 39, for a discussion of self-imposed regulations; Culliton,
Public Participation in Science: Still in Need of Definition, 192 ScIEcE 451, 452
(1976).
11 See Trippett, supra note 1, at 73.
75 Id.
7, Another aspect of the issue of public control of recombinant DNA research is
the ethical considerations of "genetic engineering." Particularly objectionable to some
critics is the possible future application of the techniques to the genetic make-up of
[Vol. 65
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ciety has the right to be secure from threats to the general
health and welfare, and society, through government, can in-
voke its police power to protect that interest. Indeed, among
the most legitimate uses of the police power is its use in the
protection of the health and safety of society. 77 It is this interest
in the public's safety which is the basis for the "public partici-
pation in science" movement.
78
Advocates of regulation have taken the position that the
public should maintain strict control over scientific inquiry.79
MIT biologist Jonathan King has stated that scientists are less
than objective in assessing the impact of their own research on
society." Cal Tech biologist Robert Sinsheimer explains that
the reason for this lack of objectivity is the intense dedication
to one's research that is required to do productive science.8'
This view, simply stated, asserts that science is too important
to be left to the scientists."
Those who favor the "public control" position insist on a
moratorium on recombinant DNA research, at least until there
is more substantial public investigation.8 3 Even the Guidelines
imposed on NIH-funded research are felt by some critics to be
insufficient controls on the researchers." Such was the position
of Mayor Vellucci of Cambridge in his effort to ban much of
the recombinant DNA research at Harvard and MIT.
human beings. This objection differs from the objection based on public safety in that
it is not a potential danger to human health, but a threat to human integrity, dignity,
and individuality. Edsall, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, 188 SCIENCE 687, 688
(1975). See generally, SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (M. Lipkin & P. Rowley
ed. 1974); P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN (1970).
11 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 308 (1964).
' Culliton, supra note 73, at 452.
7' Id.; Culliton, Kennedy: Pushing for More Public Input in Research, 188 SCIENCE
1187, 1189 (1975).
See Wade, supra note 39.
RI Wade, Recombinant DNA: A Critic Questions the Right to Free Inquiry, 194
SCIENCE 303, 305 (1976).
'n See Trippett, supra note 1, at 73; Sinsheimer, The Right to Free Inquiry, 190
SCIENCE 768 (1975).
Wade, supra note 42, at 560.
See Wade, supra note 81, at 303; see also Wade, supra note 39.
Wade, supra note 50.
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C. The Need for a Moderate Approach to Public Involvement
in the Control of Genetic Research
Both the rights of scientists to free inquiry and the rights
of the public to protection of its health and welfare are rights
valuable to society in the long run. Therefore, the approach
taken should satisfy the interests of each group while infringing
as little as possible on the rights of the other group. Even mem-
bers of the scientific community have realized that freedom
from restraint on research is unrealistic and maybe even unde-
sirable. 6 Dr. John Edsall, reporting for the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science Committee on Scientific
Freedom and Responsibility, 7 stated that the pursuit of knowl-
edge through research is limited by the risk involved in pursu-
ing that knowledge. 8 The fact that the scientists themselves
were the first to "expose" the possibility of danger of recombi-
nant DNA research and voluntarily undertook to establish
their own regulations shows that the scientific community feels
the need for control, even if only internally-imposed control.
But some degree of public involvement in the regulation of
scientific research is the only way society can assure itself that
its rights will be protected. Furthermore, though scientific re-
search, including research involving recombinant DNA, is
often sophisticated and complicated, members of the non-
scientific public can make sense out of it and arrive at a ra-
tional decision concerning its potential impact. 9
But the involvement of the public in the regulation of sci-
ence must be restrained if the scientists' right to free inquiry
is to be protected. There must be a limit on the magnitude of
public control so that the pursuit of knowledge through scien-
tific research is not unnecessarily stifled. The scientific com-
munity itself can do much to limit public control by gaining
public trust. Scientists can attain public confidence by ensur-
" See Comment, supra note 27, at 417, for a discussion of the desirability of
subjecting scientists to the pressures of the political process.
" Edsall, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, 188 SCIENCE 687, at 687 (1975).
Earl Warren, former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, was a member
of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility. Id.
I For example, there are limits on the use of human subjects in experiments. Id.
at 688.
" See Culliton, supra note 73, at 453.
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ing openness and candor in their proceedings. 0 Gaining public
trust through such means could reduce the present spirit of
skepticism toward science and the feelings that science needs
to be tightly controlled."
Public input into scientific decision-making, however,
should be limited to just that-input, not absolute control.
Regulation of science by some means is certainly a proper
method of achieving public input into scientific decision-
making. But whatever committees," agencies,93 courts,94 com-
missions,9" or commissioners 9 are established to regulate scien-
tific research, the regulators have the responsibility to protect
the rights of the scientists as well as the interests of the public.
It is imperative that the regulators consciously prevent them-
selves from becoming vehicles of public demands that all re-
search meet the test of social desirability. But where a clear
risk to the welfare of the public is involved, the regulators have
the responsibility of protecting the public's interest.
CONCLUSION
The only statement that can be made with certainty con-
cerning the risks to public welfare involved in recombinant
DNA research is that the risks are not precisely known. But the
mere possibility that such risks exist and that the risks may be
Wade, Gene-Splicing: Critics of Research Get More Brickbats than Bouquets,
195 SCIENCE 466, 469 (1977).
" See Trippett, supra note 1, at 73.
" See, e.g., the Review Board established by Mayor Vellucci in Cambridge.
,3 See, e.g., the National Institutes of Health, which established the NIH Guide-
lines.
1, "Science Courts" have been suggested as a way to safeguard the public's inter-
est in scientific research. Letter from John C. Cobb, in 194 SCIENCE 674 (1976). Such
courts would not actually render verdicts but would attempt to determine the proba-
bility of harmful effects or results of certain types of experiments or technological
innovations. Simpson, Science Court: Good Idea, 43 THINK, January/February, 1977,
at 28.
,1 The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, which is involved in the development of guidelines on fetal
experimentation, has been discussed as a successful example of the commission ap-
proach to achieving public input. Culliton, supra note 73, at 453.
" See, e.g., the New York Attorney General's proposal to use the Commissioner
of Public Health as a licensing agent. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, supra note 2.
'1 See Trippett, supra note 1, at 73.
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substantial gives the public the right to regulate recombinant
DNA research. The public's interest in its health and welfare
must be protected. The public cannot be assured that this
interest will be protected if scientists are left to regulate them-
selves.
Government, as the agent of the public, has the responsi-
bility to assure public input into control of recombinant DNA
research, as well as any other scientific pursuits which could
threaten the welfare of society. But such input and control
must be limited. The rights of scientists freely to conduct re-
search is a cherished right and one that serves society in the
long run. Recombinant DNA research may eventually result in
the development of new technologies which may be beneficial
to society. But if the research is unnecessarily hampered by
overzealous regulation, such benefits may never be realized.
Thus the recombinant DNA research controversy represents a
situation where regulation must establish a crucial balance
between protecting the rights of the public and protecting the
rights of the scientific community. If the regulations or lack of
regulations tip the balance to either side, society will eventu-
ally be the loser.
Frank Becker
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